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THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL’S WILL: 
A TALE OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
Stephen R. Alton* 
ABSTRACT 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s classic novella, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 
published in 1886, is the well-known tale of a respected scientist (Dr. Henry Jekyll) who transforms 
himself into an evil-doer (Mr. Edward Hyde). While the work raises issues of tort and criminal 
liability, this article analyzes the legal issues presented by one particular and crucial plot device that 
Stevenson employs—the last will of Dr. Jekyll. This will so obsesses Jekyll’s friend and solicitor, 
Gabriel John Utterson (through whose eyes the story unfolds), that he is impelled to seek the truth 
behind his friend’s relationship to Hyde. At the end of Utterson’s search, the solicitor learns about 
Jekyll’s dangerous scientific experiment. This discovery leads to the respected doctor’s moral downfall 
and his physical death. 
This article is presented as an imagined dialogue between the article’s author and Utterson, 
Jekyll’s lawyer, concerning the issues surrounding Jekyll’s mental capacity to make the will that left 
the doctor’s estate to Hyde. Jekyll’s will is an excellent case study for the application of various legal 
rules and doctrines regarding a testator’s mental capacity to make a valid will. These rules include 
those relating to the general soundness of the testator’s state of mind, the issues of undue influence 
and duress, and the doctrine of insane delusion. Stevenson’s novella is a wonderful vehicle for exam-
ining important legal problems that remain as relevant in America today as they were in England 
during Queen Victoria’s reign. 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s classic novella, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde, published in 1886, is difficult to categorize. Vladimir Nabokov paradoxically 
called the tale “lame” as a mystery story, because modern mysteries are “the very 
negation of style,” while Stevenson’s work is “a phenomenon of style.”1 In his Lec-
tures on Literature, Nabokov rejects the idea that Stevenson’s work is either a mystery 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; A.B., Harvard University; J.D., University of Texas; 
Ed.M., Harvard University; LL.M., Columbia University. I wish to acknowledge the useful suggestions on an earlier 
version of this article made by Dr. Andrew Morriss, dean of the Texas A&M University School of Law. I also would 
like to thank those colleagues and peers who provided helpful criticism after my presentation of this article at the 
2016 Texas A&M University School of Law Faculty Speaker Series and the 2016 Annual Meeting of the Association 
for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities. 
 1. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LECTURES ON LITERATURE 179-80 (Fredson Bowers ed., 1980). 
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or detective story, on the one hand, or a parable or allegory, on the other hand.2 The 
work is a good “‘bogey story,’”3, which “‘lies nearer to poetry than to ordinary prose 
fiction.’”4 
The author Leonard Wolf, in his introduction to The Essential Doctor Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde, agrees that “category making . . . does not work well” with this Stevenson 
story because “it is a great work of fiction,” which is “a living text.”5 However, Wolf 
views the novella as an allegory.6 Wolf  observes, 
[W]hat we see is not necessarily what we get. What we see is the story of a man who has 
found a way to separate his good from his evil self.  What we get is a complex moral and 
psychological allegory capable of moving readers in any number of ways.7 
 
Nabokov wryly summarizes Jekyll and Hyde’s now-familiar plot as follows:  
 
Dr. Jekyll is a fat, benevolent physician, not without human frailties, who 
at times by means of a potion projects himself into, or concentrates or pre-
cipitates, an evil person of brutal and animal nature taking the name of 
Hyde, in which character he leads a patchy criminal life of sorts. For a time 
he is able to revert to his Jekyll personality—there is a down-to-Hyde drug 
and a back-to-Jekyll drug—but gradually his better nature weakens and fi-
nally the back-to-Jekyll potion fails, and he poisons himself when on the 
verge of exposure.8 
 
The present article does not deal with the many literary merits of Stevenson’s 
novella, nor does it deal with the legal issues of tort or criminal liability that Hyde’s 
violent and murderous actions precipitate. Instead, my purpose here is to examine 
one particular and crucial plot device that Stevenson uses—the will of Dr. Henry 
Jekyll. This will so obsesses Jekyll’s friend and solicitor, Gabriel John Utterson 
(through whose eyes the story unfolds), that he is impelled to seek the truth behind 
his friend’s relationship to Hyde. In the course of Utterson’s search, the solicitor 
ultimately learns the truth about Jekyll’s dangerous scientific experiment, which leads 
to the respected doctor’s moral downfall and his physical death. 
Despite Nabokov’s skepticism, Utterson is a detective of sorts as he searches 
for the mysterious Edward Hyde’s hold on the lawyer’s friend and client Dr. Jekyll. 
Utterson is tenacious but rather inept as a detective, for he learns the truth about Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde only after Jekyll’s death and only through the medium of two 
                                                          
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 180 (quoting Robert Lois Stevenson). 
 4. Id. (quoting Stephen Gwynn). 
 5. LEONARD WOLF, THE ESSENTIAL DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE 3 (1995) [hereinafter ESSENTIAL]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. NABAKOV, supra note 1, at 179. 
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posthumous letters addressed to him, one from their mutual friend, Dr. Hastie Lan-
yon, and the other from Henry Jekyll himself.9 In this regard, Utterson is less like his 
fictional contemporary, the legendary detective Sherlock Holmes, and more like the 
Scotland Yard professionals around whom Holmes runs circles. Like Holmes, Utter-
son follows various clues to the mystery of Jekyll and Hyde. Unlike Holmes, Utter-
son’s magnifying glass, in retrospect, was entirely opaque. 
My thesis in this article is that Jekyll’s will, when viewed from the naïve narra-
tor’s standpoint (that is, before Jekyll’s secret transformations into Hyde are revealed 
at the end of the story), is a wonderful vehicle for examining various legal rules and 
doctrines that might mitigate the soundness of the testator’s state of mind and, thus, 
his or her capacity to make a valid will. These legal problems, which remain as rele-
vant in America today as they were in England during Queen Victoria’s reign, include 
the general soundness of the state of mind of the testator, the doctrine of insane 
delusion, and the rules regarding undue influence and duress. Jekyll’s will is a holo-
graph, which, conveniently, obviated the need for any witnesses to its execution and 
also eliminated the necessity of Utterson’s “assistance” in its preparation: Jekyll him-
self drafted the will.10 Jekyll’s will also contains a provision that appears to constitute 
something resembling a power of attorney from Jekyll to Hyde (Utterson refers to it 
as a “deed of gift”) in case of Jekyll’s disappearance.11 Finally, in what turns out to 
be Jekyll’s final will and testament, Utterson is amazed, at the story’s end, to find that 
his friend has replaced Hyde’s name in the will with that of Utterson himself, raising 
the issue of bequests to attorneys.12 Along the way, this article discusses the matter 
of who—if anyone—might have standing to challenge the validity of the initial will, 
which Utterson found so odious. That Stevenson would employ such a central device 
as Jekyll’s will as a driver of his plot—and use the will in such a way that the very real 
legal issues it raises at times blur the line between fact and fiction—should not be 
surprising, given the fact that Stevenson himself was a lawyer, having studied law in 
Scotland and England and having been admitted to the Edinburgh bar in 1875.13 
Perhaps Utterson is a stand-in for Stevenson in the story. 
For most of the nineteenth-century, “the British novel was preoccupied with 
law.”14 The rise of legal professionalism in Britain at this time helps to explain this 
preoccupation with the law and the literary representations of lawyers.15 In an article 
entitled Gothic Law, Professor Leslie J. Moran agrees that law is “a regular theme in 
Gothic literature.”16 Moran describes Gothic literature as that in which “[t]he unrea-
son and the irrational are banished [by the scientific only to] return to haunt and 
                                                          
 9. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 103.  
 10. Id. at 43-44. 
 11. Id. at 44, 102. 
 12. Id. at 102. 
 13. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 12-14. 
 14. Nicola Lacey, The Way We Lived Then: The Legal Profession and the 19th-Century Novel, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 599, 
600 (2011). 
 15. Id. at 602. 
 16. Leslie J. Moran, Gothic Law, 10 GRIFFITH L. REV. 75 (2001). 
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disturb.”17 In Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, the irrational transformation is conjured by 
scientific experimentation where the irrational returns not merely to haunt, but to 
murder, which “is the Gothic act par excellence.”18 Moran cites Jekyll and Hyde as an 
example of Gothic story in which a lawyer appears as the narrator; the lawyer’s nar-
ration personifies “law as order” and “guarantees the possibility of the truth of the 
narrative.”19 Of course, as the reader of Stevenson's novella learns in the end, Utter-
son is a naïve narrator, and what he has believed throughout the story’s action turns 
out to have been inaccurate and untrue. The last two epistolary chapters of the book 
solve the mystery without the mediation of Utterson or any other narrator.20 As soon 
as Utterson discovers Jekyll’s final will naming Utterson as his beneficiary, Utterson 
disappears as the focus of the narration, and Jekyll is dead.21 
Professor Katherine Kearney Maynard asserts that Jekyll and Hyde’s Victorian 
professionals follow a “code of silence regarding each other’s lapses and peccadil-
los.”22  These men maintain this code of silence in the novella “by communicating 
crucial information in mysterious wills, in enigmatic letters, or in the series of elabo-
rately sealed narratives that Lanyon and Jekyll entrust to Utterson at the end of the 
text.”23 According to Professor Stephen Arata, Jekyll and Hyde is “obsessively con-
cerned with writing of various kinds: wills, letters, chemical formulae, bank drafts, 
‘full statements,’ and the like.”24 Indeed, Utterson first learned of Hyde’s existence 
through Jekyll’s holographic will, of which Utterson “never approved.”25 The entire 
plot of the story unfolds because of Utterson’s anxiety about, and aversion to, this 
will.26 Why Jekyll would make a will leaving his entire estate to Hyde is beyond Ut-
terson’s comprehension, and the lawyer jumps to the conclusion that Hyde must be 
blackmailing Jekyll.27 However, Jekyll’s will hinders rather than furthers Utterson’s 
solution of the case because the latter’s “epistemological orientation is radically in-
sufficient” to comprehend “the case’s ‘true’ strangeness” from his “legalistic point of 
view.”28 
In an article entitled The Will as Personal Narrative, Professor Karen Sneddon 
opines that a will “should be conceptualized and written as a personal narrative.”29 
But, Jekyll’s will is very cryptic and, from the viewpoint of both Utterson and the 
                                                          
 17. Id. at 80. 
 18. Id. at 76. 
 19. Id. at 77. 
 20. E.D. Cohen, Hyding the Subject?: The Antinomies of Masculinity in “The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,” 37 
NOVEL: A FORUM ON FICTION 181, 186 (2003). 
 21. Id. at 187. 
 22. Katherine Kearney Maynard, The Perils and Pleasures of Professionalism in Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde and Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet and Other Fictions, 5 THE EUROPEAN LEGACY 365, 371 (2000). 
 23. Id. at 372. 
 24. Stephen D. Arata, The Sedulous Ape: Atavism, Professionalism, and Stevenson’s “Jekyll and Hyde,” 37 CRITICISM 233, 
251 (1995). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Cohen, supra note 20, at 187. 
 27. Id. at 187-88. 
 28. Id. at 188. 
 29. Karen J. Sneddon, The Will as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355, 360 (2012). 
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reader, is a rather misleading narrative of his relationship with Hyde. In fact, this 
cryptic will, with its elliptical and ambiguous narrative (Jekyll’s “friend and benefactor 
Edward Hyde”), remains misleading until the end of the novella, when all is made 
clear.30 Certainly, Stevenson has given the reader hints or clues to Hyde’s identity 
along the way, as Hyde often “bursts out and exposes” Jekyll.31 The will is the most 
important place—the most important hint or clue to the reader—where Hyde does 
this.32 Utterson first learns of Hyde’s existence when he reads the man’s name in 
Jekyll’s will—a will so repugnant to Utterson that he has refused to draft or sanction 
it in any way.33 
As a personal narrative, Jekyll’s will is so important in its ambiguity that Profes-
sor Carol Margaret Davison concludes Utterson in fact murdered Jekyll, or at the 
very least forced Jekyll into suicide.34 Davison posits that Utterson discovered Jekyll’s 
secret long before it is revealed to the reader in the last two chapters of the novella; 
she argues that Utterson’s motive for hounding Jekyll to his death was to become the 
legatee of the latter’s entire estate, which Utterson (as Jekyll’s only remaining friend) 
must have suspected Jekyll would leave to him.35 This is an unusual and unique in-
terpretation of the story, and one that turns Utterson from hero to villain: in Da-
vison’s words, this lawyer is a “liar” and this erstwhile friend is a “fiend.”36 However, 
I read the story in the conventional way, with Utterson as friend, quasi-detective, and 
naïve narrator who comes upon the truth of Jekyll’s alter ego, Hyde, only upon Hyde-
Jekyll’s death. 
Utterson, the solicitor, certainly seems obsessed by Jekyll’s holographic will.  
“Beyond the payment of a few small sums to the members of the doctor’s house-
hold,” the doctor’s will left “‘all his possessions’” to his “‘friend and benefactor Ed-
ward Hyde.’”37 The third-person narrator of the story states that “[t]his document 
had long been the lawyer’s eyesore.”38 In the course of a conversation between Ut-
terson and his friend Jekyll, the lawyer raises the subject of the will, saying that he 
“‘never approved of it.’”39 Jekyll responds “a trifle sharply” that he knows this, be-
cause “‘[y]ou have told me so.’”40 At this meeting, Jekyll also tells Utterson, “‘you are 
unfortunate in such a client. I never saw a man so distressed as you were by my 
                                                          
 30. See ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 44. 
 31. Ronald R. Thomas, In the Company of Strangers: Absent Voices in Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and Beckett’s 
Company, 32 MFS MODERN FICTION STUDIES 157, 163 (1986). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 162. 
 34. Carol Margaret Davison, A Battle of Wills: Solving the Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, in TROUBLED 
LEGACIES: NARRATIVE AND INHERITANCE 137, 157 (Allan Hepburn ed., 2007). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 44. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 56. 
 40. Id. 
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will.’”41 The night after the funeral of Utterson’s and Jekyll’s mutual friend, Dr. Has-
tie Lanyon, Utterson—alone in his study—thinks again of Jekyll’s “mad will.”42 Fi-
nally, in Jekyll’s “full statement of the case” (chapter ten of the novella), Jekyll’s state-
ment to Utterson refers to “that will to which you so much objected.”43 When 
Utterson and Jekyll’s butler, Poole, have found Mr. Hyde dead at the end of the tale 
(although they do not yet know that this discovery also means the death of Dr. Jekyll 
himself), they find a new holographic will among Jekyll’s papers; Utterson, “with in-
describable amazement,” reads his own name in place of Hyde’s as the beneficiary in 
Jekyll’s new will.44 
My article—in the form of a dialogue with G. J. Utterson, Esquire—begins with 
a discussion of the general soundness of Dr. Jekyll’s mind at the time he made his 
will in favor of Mr. Hyde. This article continues with a brief dialogue about the doc-
trine of insane delusion and whether Dr. Jekyll was under such a delusion when he 
made his will. Following this dialogue, Mr. Utterson and I examine whether Dr. Jekyll 
was under undue influence or duress when he made his will. We then discuss the so-
called Slayer Rule, by which a beneficiary who kills the testator might be deprived of 
his or her share of the slain testator’s estate, as the story contains numerous references 
to Utterson’s (and others’) suspicions that Hyde might murder—or might already 
have murdered—Jekyll at the tale’s climax. After touching on the matter of who 
might have standing to contest Jekyll’s will, I finish by asking, somewhat imperti-
nently, whether the solicitor believes that Dr. Jekyll’s final will, which named him as 
the beneficiary, was invalid for some of these same reasons. 
In 2011, I published an article on the significance of donative transfers in the 
Sherlock Holmes canon.45 That article was constructed much like one of Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle’s stories, in that it was a dialogue recorded by Dr. John Watson that 
ostensibly took place between Holmes and Watson analyzing donative transfer issues 
in their adventures. In the present article, I use a similar device to tell my own story 
of the solicitor and the doctor’s will. This article—save for this introduction—is pre-
sented as an imagined dialogue between myself and Jekyll’s friend, Gabriel John Ut-
terson, Esquire, the solicitor through whose eyes Stevenson’s narrator tells the cele-
brated story.46 If Mr. Utterson and I had ever engaged in an extended conversation 
analyzing the legal issues raised by Henry Jekyll’s two wills (the first in favor of Hyde 
and the second in favor of Utterson himself), that conversation might have proceeded 
in the following way. 
                                                          
 41. Id. 
 42. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 82. 
 43. Id. at 123. 
 44. Id. at 102. 
 45. Stephen R. Alton, The Game is Afoot!: The Significance of Donative Transfers in the Sherlock Holmes Canon, 46  REAL 
PROP., TR. AND EST. L.J. 125 (2011).   
 46. Imagined dialogues have been used in the “story-telling” tradition of legal scholarship for at least three dec-
ades. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); 
RICHARD DELGADO, JUSTICE AT WAR: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS DURING TIMES OF CRISIS (2003); and 
RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995).  
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GENERAL MENTAL CAPACITY (SOUNDNESS OF MIND): OUR DIALOGUE BEGINS 
As I was at work late one night in my office, I heard a faint knock at my office 
door. The tap had been so hesitant that I wasn’t certain I in fact had heard anything. 
Perhaps I had nodded off and been dreaming? Continuing to work, I again was in-
terrupted, this time by a slightly louder, more definite knock upon my door. 
“Who’s there?” I called out. 
“It is I, Gabriel John Utterson,” responded a voice with an oh-so-proper Eng-
lish accent. “Might I please have a few words with you, Mr. Alton? I should like to 
speak with you about the sad matter of my friend, the late Dr. Henry Jekyll.” 
Certainly, I knew the name Gabriel John Utterson well. Utterson was the attor-
ney and friend of Dr. Henry Jekyll, of Jekyll & Hyde fame. It was Utterson, the so-
licitor, who first investigated the identity of Edward Hyde, fearful of Hyde’s hold on 
Utterson’s friend, Jekyll. There were a number of things I would love to ask Utterson; 
indeed, as a teacher of Wills & Estates, I have long been interested in the legal issues 
surrounding Jekyll’s mental capacity to make a will. In Robert Louis Stevenson’s ac-
count of this story, it is Utterson’s revulsion at Jekyll’s will that impels the solicitor to 
seek out the loathsome Hyde. Perhaps this would be my chance to discuss that fa-
mous will with Utterson. 
“Please do come in,” I responded, and Utterson entered my cluttered office. 
He was a man of about my height, perhaps a bit stockier. His dress was rather formal, 
wearing striped pants, a morning coat (even though it was late at night), a heavily 
starched white shirtfront, and a black silk cravat. He carried a top hat in his hands. I 
reached out my hand to shake his; he deftly moved his top hat so as to free his right 
hand to meet mine. “Please take a seat, Mr. Utterson.” 
“Thank you, Mr. Alton. I have wanted to meet you, sir. I understand that you 
have taken an interest in the strange and sad case of my late friend, Dr. Henry Jekyll.” 
“Indeed I have, Mr. Utterson. You have come at a most opportune time, sir, as 
I have recently been teaching, in my Wills class, the legal issues involving a testator’s 
mental capacity to make a will. It has always seemed to me that the holographic will 
of your late friend, Dr. Henry Jekyll, presents an excellent case study of many of these 
legal issues. Your fortunate—I might say serendipitous—appearance in my office to-
night will, if I may be so bold, present me with an opportunity to discuss these issues 
with you. I understand the constraints of the attorney-client privilege, but, after all, it 
has been many, many years since the death of Dr. Jekyll, and he confessed the entire 
story both to you and Dr. Hastie Lanyon, who was not an attorney. So, perhaps, there 
will be no problem if we explore these matters, Mr. Utterson?” 
“I would welcome the opportunity, Mr. Alton,” the solicitor assured me. “What 
would you like to ask me about the sad business of my late, lamented friend?” 
“Please allow me to begin by noting the many times throughout the course of 
your experiences that you or others—including Dr. Jekyll himself—made reference 
to the doctor’s state of mind; you and the others believed he exhibited signs of mental 
illness that might have affected his testamentary capacity. The first such instance, that 
I recall, occurred early in your story, when you came home to your ‘bachelor’s house 
in sombre spirits’ and, after a dinner eaten ‘without relish,’ you removed the envelope 
7
Alton: The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll’s Will: A Tale of Testamentary Cap
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
 270 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:263 
containing the doctor’s will from your safe and studied its contents.47 Dr. Jekyll had 
made this will himself, as you ‘had refused to lend the least assistance in the making 
of it,’ given your disgust with its contents, for it left all of the doctor’s possessions to 
‘his “friend and benefactor, Edward Hyde.”’48 The dispositive provisions ‘offended’ 
you ‘both as a lawyer and as a lover of the sane and customary sides of life.’49 You 
thought ‘it was madness.’50 Am I correct, so far? Surely, you will tell me if I err?” 
Utterson nodded his assent, and I proceeded. “Thus, you initially referred to 
Dr. Jekyll’s will, first, as being offensive to you because, implicitly, it was something 
that was neither ‘sane’ nor ‘customary’ and, second, as being the product of ‘mad-
ness.’”51 
“As you know, Mr. Alton,” interjected Utterson, “this will had always greatly 
troubled me.” Now, it was my turn to nod my assent before continuing. 
“You decided, after returning the ‘obnoxious paper’ to your safe, to speak with 
your mutual friend, Dr. Hastie Lanyon, so you proceeded to Cavendish Square, where 
Dr. Lanyon resided.52 Dr. Lanyon told you that Dr. Jekyll had become ‘“too fanci-
ful”’ and had ‘“begun to go wrong, wrong in mind.”’53 Once again, here is a reference 
to Dr. Jekyll’s state of mind—presumably the same state of mind the doctor was 
laboring under when he made the will to which you so objected. You see, Mr. Utter-
son, I want to establish Dr. Jekyll’s state of mind at, or at least near, the time he made 
his holographic will benefiting Mr. Hyde. I am attempting to do so by recounting the 
numerous references to his apparent madness or insanity that you and others make 
throughout the story. Dr. Lanyon has now made another such reference. 
“The next set of references to Dr. Jekyll’s general state of mind occurred after 
you dined with a much-improved Dr. Jekyll, who had seen the ‘evil influence [of Mr. 
Hyde] . . . withdrawn’ of late.54 Thus, you were surprised when, three times within 
the next week, the doctor’s ‘door was shut against’ you.55 His butler, Poole, told you 
that the doctor ‘“was confined to the house”’ and ‘“saw no one.”’56 Once again, you 
decided to visit Dr. Lanyon to inquire what he might know of this sudden change in 
Dr. Jekyll’s behavior.57 You were surprised at the change for the worse in Dr. Lan-
yon’s appearance; he told you that he had had ‘“a shock”’ from which he would 
‘“never recover.”’58 When you immediately tried to broach the purpose of your visit, 
stating that Dr. Jekyll also was ‘“ill,”’ Dr. Lanyon stopped you, saying, ‘“I am quite 
done with that person; and I beg that you will spare me any allusion to one whom I 
                                                          
 47. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 43. 
 48. Id. at 44. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 44. 
 53. Id. at 45. 
 54. Id. at 79. 
 55. Id. at 80. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 80. 
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regard as dead.”’59 He told you that someday you might learn the truth—‘“the right 
and wrong of this”’—but you should leave his home ‘“if you cannot keep clear of 
this accursed topic.”’60 
“You left Dr. Lanyon’s house, as he had asked you to do, and returned home, 
where you wrote a letter to Dr. Jekyll, receiving a prompt reply from him.61 His reply 
was ‘sometimes darkly mysterious in drift;’ in it, he referred to himself as both ‘“the 
chief of sinners”’ and ‘“the chief of sufferers.”’62 You thought his ‘peace of mind and 
the whole tenor of his life were wrecked,’ and so great a change ‘pointed to mad-
ness.’63 Three weeks later, Dr. Lanyon died.64 You had received an envelope from 
him that might solve the entire mystery of Dr. Jekyll’s actions, but you decided to 
defer reading the contents of the envelope because the enclosed envelope was 
marked that it was ‘“not to be opened till the death or disappearance of Dr. Henry 
Jekyll.”’65 Your ‘professional honour and faith to . . . [your] dead friend were strin-
gent obligations.’66 But, the linking of Dr. Jekyll’s name with death or disappearance 
reminded you of ‘the mad will.’67 Speaking with Poole, you learned that the doctor 
‘now more than ever confined himself to his cabinet,’ and that ‘he was out of spir-
its.’68 I infer that, once again, you believed Dr. Jekyll to be seriously disturbed in his 
mind, yes?” 
“You are correct, sir,” replied Utterson. “Pray, proceed.” 
I did as Utterson asked. “Later in your remarkable experience, you and your 
cousin, Mr. Richard Enfield, chanced upon Dr. Jekyll at his window, ‘taking the air 
with an infinite sadness of mien, like some disconsolate prisoner.’69 The doctor ad-
mitted that he was ‘“very low.”’70 As the doctor would neither come out to walk with 
you and Mr. Enfield nor invite you into his cabinet, you agreed to stay and talk with 
him through his window.71 Suddenly, Dr. Jekyll’s ‘smile was struck out of his face 
and succeeded by an expression of such abject terror and despair, as froze’ your ‘very 
blood;’ instantly and without explanation, Jekyll shut the window and disappeared 
from view.72 You and your cousin were horrified over what you had seen.73 Once 
again, I infer that you thought the doctor was suffering from a debilitating mental 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 81. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 81. 
 64. Id. at 82. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 82-83. 
 69. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 86. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 86-87. 
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illness of some sort—perhaps depression, as he had just told you that he was ‘“very 
low.”’74 
“Now we come to the final incident before you learned the whole, awful truth 
about the matter,” I averred. “On Dr. Jekyll’s last night alive, you and Poole stood 
outside his cabinet door, and the doctor once again turned you away.75 Both you and 
Poole were quite worried: Poole believed that his master had been murdered—‘“mas-
ter’s made away with”’76—and you believed that the doctor was sick—‘“seized with 
one of those maladies that both torture and deform the sufferer.”’77 You arrived at 
your conclusion based on your reading of a letter shared with you by Poole, which 
was from Dr. Jekyll to a pharmacy, imploring the pharmacist, ‘“For God’s sake . . . 
find me [i.e., Jekyll] some of the old [drug].”’78 Once again, you thought that Dr. 
Jekyll’s ‘“eagerness to find this drug”’ indicated a grave illness that might have de-
formed his mind as well as his body.79 You and Poole decided to break down the 
laboratory door to find out what in fact had happened, and you discovered Mr. Hyde, 
dressed in Dr. Jekyll’s clothing.80 You also discovered the remnants of the drug—the 
antidote—that your friend used to turn himself back into Dr. Jekyll from Mr. Hyde.81 
Finally, you found what proved to be Dr. Jekyll’s final will—another holograph—but 
this time, your name appeared as the primary beneficiary, much to your ‘indescribable 
amazement.’82 I shall refer to this will as the ‘Utterson Will’ in order to distinguish it 
from the earlier will the doctor made in favor of Mr. Hyde. 
“Thus, as I count them, there were at least seven occasions when you said or 
believed that your friend, Dr. Henry Jekyll, was of unsound mind before you discov-
ered the truth about him at the very end of your tale. You learned the truth about 
your friend’s amazing transformation by reading the narrative of Dr. Lanyon and the 
confession of Dr. Jekyll himself, both of which your friend referred to in his final 
note to you, the note that you and Poole found on Dr. Jekyll’s table in his cabinet 
after you found Mr. Hyde’s body and the Utterson Will.83 
“In Dr. Lanyon’s account, he reproduces the contents of the letter from Dr. 
Jekyll imploring Lanyon’s help in securing the antidote from Jekyll’s own laboratory 
and returning it to him when Mr. Hyde should call upon Dr. Lanyon.84 The letter 
begs Dr. Lanyon to follow Dr. Jekyll’s instructions precisely, lest the former’s con-
                                                          
 74. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 86. 
 75. Id. at 91-92. 
 76. Id. at 92. 
 77. Id. at 94. 
 78. Id. at 93. 
 79. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 94 & n.17. 
 80. Id. at 98-100. 
 81. Id. at 101. Poole tells Utterson that ‘“this is the same drug that I was always bringing him.’” Id. Of course, at 
this point in the story, neither Poole nor Utterson have learned of Dr. Jekyll’s transformations into Mr. Hyde. 
 82. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 102. 
 83. See id. at 102-03. 
 84. Id. at 105-07. 
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science be charged with the latter’s ‘“death”’ or the ‘“shipwreck”’ of the latter’s ‘“rea-
son.”’85 Immediately upon reading Dr. Jekyll’s letter, Dr. Lanyon was certain of Dr. 
Jekyll’s insanity.86After carrying out the instructions in the letter, Dr. Lanyon was 
even more certain of Dr. Jekyll’s mental instability: he said that he was ‘convinced’ 
he was ‘dealing with a case of cerebral disease.’87 
“Now,” I continued, “might I please examine with you the standard for whether 
a testator was of sound mind when he or she made the will?” 
“I would be interested in your assessment of the matter, Mr. Alton.” 
“And I yours, Mr. Utterson. Well, then, let us proceed, sir. Our Restatement 
(Third) of the Law of Property sets out a standard or test for the mental capacity a 
testator must meet in order to be considered of ‘sound mind’ to make a valid will. 
The test requires that the testator 
must be capable of knowing and understanding in a general way the nature and extent 
of his or her property, the natural objects of his or her bounty, and the disposition that 
he or she is making of that property, and must also be capable of relating these ele-
ments to one another and forming an orderly desire regarding the disposition of the 
property.88 
“The issues and rules that we’re discussing are universal principles of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. However, because the Wills class that I teach focuses on the 
law of my home state, Texas, I’ll use Texas law for my own convenience. The test for 
soundness of mind that Texas uses is similar to that of the Restatement. Our statutes 
require that a person be ‘of sound mind’ in order to make a valid will.89 The test most 
widely cited for being ‘of sound mind’ comes from a Texas case that is roughly con-
temporaneous with your tale, Prather v. McClelland.90 The test is stated in this case as 
follows: 
[H]e [the testator] must have been capable of understanding the nature of the business 
he was engaged in, the nature and extent of his property, the persons to whom he 
meant to devise and bequeath it, the persons dependent upon his bounty, and the 
mode of distribution among them; . . . he must have had memory sufficient to collect 
in his mind the elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them long 
enough to perceive, at least, their obvious relations to each other, and be able to form 
a reasonable judgment as to them.91 
Shall we apply the Texas test?” 
                                                          
 85. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 106. 
 86. Id. at 107. Lanyon writes, “Upon the reading of this letter, I made sure my colleague was insane.” Id. 
 87. Id. at 108. Hyde drinks the antidote that Lanyon found for him and provided to him, whereupon Hyde 
becomes, to Lanyon’s horror and incredulity, Jekyll again. Id. at 110-12. Lanyon “cannot bring” himself “to set on 
paper” the things that Jekyll told him in the hour after his transformation. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 112. 
 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(b) (Am. Law Inst. 2003) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]. 
 89. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 251.001 (West 2014) [hereinafter ESTATE CODE]. 
 90. Prather v. McClelland, 13 S.W. 543 (Tex. 1890).  
 91. Id. at 546. The Restatement’s rule does not expressly state the first element of the Texas rule—that testator 
know that he or she is making a will—but certainly this is an implicit prerequisite in the Restatement rule.  
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“Permit me, sir,” replied Utterson, “to make the first attempt at the test’s ap-
plication. As you have demonstrated, Mr. Alton, before I knew the awful truth about 
how my dear friend, Henry Jekyll, became the hideous Edward Hyde, I was most 
concerned that my friend was not of sound mind, especially at the time he made his 
initial holographic will in favor of Mr. Hyde. Thus, Dr. Jekyll’s will would have been 
invalid due to his unsound state of mind. The first element—that Dr. Jekyll was ‘ca-
pable of understanding the nature of the business he was engaged in’92—most likely 
was satisfied. After all, Dr. Jekyll himself made the will: he wrote its provisions and 
he signed it.93 The terms were clear enough, albeit they were most distasteful to me: 
In the event of my friend’s death or his ‘unexplained absence for any period exceed-
ing three calendar months,’ Mr. Hyde was to ‘step into the said Henry Jekyll’s shoes 
without delay.’94 Clearly, Henry Jekyll knew that he was making a will (and a deed of 
gift).95 
“The second element of your Prather test is that the testator must have been 
capable of understanding ‘the nature and extent of his property.’96 Once again, I must 
admit that I had no reason to believe that my friend did not know the nature or extent 
of his property. Nothing in his story gives any indication that such was the case. Thus, 
I aver that the second element of the test likely was satisfied.” 
“I agree, Mr. Utterson,” I responded, “that the first two elements of the Prather 
test were satisfied.  I also believe, if you will permit me, that the third element of the 
test was met. The testator must have been capable of understanding ‘the persons to 
whom he meant to devise and bequeath’ his property.97 Certainly, he knew he was 
leaving his estate to Edward Hyde, however distasteful that might have been to you 
and to his other friends. It seems that there can be no doubt of this. Surely, sir, you 
must accede to this conclusion, however reluctantly.” 
“Mr. Alton, I cannot deny your conclusion about this element. Furthermore, I 
must admit that the fourth element of the Prather test most likely was met in regard 
to this will: Dr. Jekyll would have needed to be capable of understanding ‘the persons 
dependent upon his bounty, and the mode of distribution among them.’98 As Henry 
Jekyll was a bachelor, without any closely related living family member, there were, 
in fact, no persons who were dependent upon his bounty. In effect, this element 
becomes a nullity under the facts of our story.” 
“Indeed, Mr. Utterson,” I asked, “do you not agree, given what you later learned 
about the relationship of Mr. Hyde to Dr. Jekyll, that one could say it was perfectly 
rational for Dr. Jekyll to conclude that Mr. Hyde—under these admittedly bizarre 
                                                          
 92. Prather, 13 S.W. at 546. 
 93. See ESSENTIAL, supra note 5. Interestingly, nowhere in the novel does Stevenson indicate that Jekyll in fact 
signed the will. However, Utterson never remarks that the will is invalid due to the absence of testator’s signature. 
Given the fact that Utterson loathed the will and, presumably, would have been delighted to find that it was invalid 
due to such a simple technicality, it can safely be assumed that Jekyll did sign the will. Moreover, Stevenson’s training 
as a lawyer would make the lack of testator’s signature on the will virtually unthinkable. 
 94. Id. at 44. 
 95. Id. In fact, Utterson refers to the will in the alternative as a “deed of gift” in the event of Jekyll’s absence. Id.  
 96. Prather, 13 S.W. at 546. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
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circumstances—was indeed a natural object of Dr. Jekyll’s bounty? Dr. Jekyll wanted 
to be certain that, should he disappear into Mr. Hyde and perhaps be declared legally 
dead, his estate would be conferred on the latter so that the material needs of Dr. 
Jekyll (in the person of Mr. Hyde) would be provided for.” The English lawyer nod-
ded to indicate his assent, and he continued his explication of the Prather test. 
“The test’s final element,” said he, “is the sticking point, Mr. Alton. Dr. Jekyll 
must have had memory sufficient to collect in his mind the elements of the business 
to be transacted [i.e., the other four elements of the test], and to hold them long 
enough [in his mind] to perceive, at least, their obvious relations to each other, and be 
able to form a reasonable judgment as to them.99 
It is the final element that I believe fails in this situation. Given his tenuous mental 
state, especially at the time of each transformation into Mr. Hyde, Henry Jekyll may 
neither have been able to perceive the other elements’ ‘relations to each other’ nor 
‘to form a reasonable judgment as to’ those other elements.100 Based on what appeared 
to be true at the time, I believed that Henry Jekyll was so deranged in his mind that 
he could not form a reasonable judgment as to the other elements. Indeed, when I 
learned the truth of his transformations into Mr. Hyde, this truly amazing fact did 
not alter my belief as to the absolute unreasonableness of his judgment at the time 
he made this will.” 
“I see your point, Mr. Utterson,” I replied. “But, I must remind you that ‘less 
capacity is required to enable a testator to make a will than for the same person to 
make a contract.’101  The test is to be applied as of the day on which the will was 
executed.102 While this question would be one of fact,103 I am simply not prepared 
to say that, as I read the story, Dr. Jekyll was unable to form a reasonable judgment 
as to the other elements of the test on the day he made his holographic will in favor 
of Mr. Hyde. I say this most respectfully, Mr. Utterson.” 
“I appreciate your opinion, Mr. Alton,” Utterson replied, “but I am not able to 
concur for the reasons I have already indicated. Indeed, Dr. Jekyll’s ‘full statement of 
the case’ convinces me that he was mad or at the very least laboring under an insane 
delusion.104 Certainly, sir, this would have been a question of fact for a jury to decide, 
based on the evidence adduced.” 
OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUES:  INSANE DELUSION 
After this exchange, Utterson and I fell into an awkward silence for perhaps a 
minute or two, after which time the lawyer resumed our dialogue. 
                                                          
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Prather, 13 S.W. at 546.  
 102. Id. See also, WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 317 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter McGovern]; Lee v. Lee, 
424 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. 1968).   
 103. See, MCGOVERN, supra note 102, at 319. 
 104. See ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 115-36. 
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“Mr. Alton,” said the solicitor, “there is another reason why I believe Dr. Jekyll 
was not of sound mind as of the date on which he executed the holographic will in 
favor of Mr. Hyde. At the time, I believed that Henry Jekyll was suffering from what 
my friend, Dr. John Watson, has referred to as an ‘idée fixe.’105 In other words, he 
may have been suffering from an insane delusion.” 
“I know the testamentary disability to which you refer, Mr. Utterson,” I re-
joined. “The Prather court also discussed this alternative theory of unsoundness of 
mind, defining the term as ‘the belief of a state of supposed facts which no rational 
person would believe.’106 Another iteration is ‘the belief of a state of supposed facts 
that do not exist, and which no rational person would believe.’107 It has been said 
that ‘a person who is entirely capable of attending to his business affairs may never-
theless have his mind so warped and deranged by some false and unfounded belief 
that he is incapable of formulating a rational plan of testamentary disposition.’108 
Another Texas court explained the rule as follows: 
When the testator’s false belief amounts, in law, to an insane delusion and the terms 
of his will are influenced thereby, testamentary capacity is lacking even though he 
might know the nature and extent of his property, the effect of his will, and the natural 
objects of his bounty, and be able to handle complex business matters.109 
That said, a testator’s ‘mistaken belief is not an “insane delusion” if there was some 
rational basis for it.’110 
“Our Restatement,” I continued, “defines an insane delusion as follows: ‘a be-
lief that is so against the evidence and reason that it must be the product of derange-
ment.’111 However, a ‘belief resulting from a process of reasoning from existing facts 
is not an insane delusion, even though the reasoning is imperfect or the conclusion 
illogical.’”112 
“Mr. Alton,” said Utterson, “I believe that my friend Henry Jekyll was laboring 
under an insane delusion when he made his will conferring his estate upon Edward 
Hyde. Certainly, at the time he first delivered the hateful will to my care, I thought 
that Dr. Jekyll must have become mad to do such a thing, for the reasons you have 
already noted.” 
“Well, sir,” I replied, “I am not convinced of this. What might have been his 
insane delusion? At the time of the delivery of his will to you, you had no specific 
idea as to what delusion, if any, might have produced the will. Establishing an insane 
delusion requires proof of the specific, supposed facts that do not exist and that no 
rational person would believe. If I may be permitted to say this, Mr. Utterson, mere 
                                                          
 105. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of the Six Napoleons, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 582, 584 
(Doubleday & Company n.d.) (1930).  In a non-testamentary context, Watson referred to a form of “monomania. . . 
which may be trifling in character, and accompanied by complete sanity in every other way.” Id. 
 106. Prather, 13 S.W. at 546. 
 107. Knight v. Edwards, 153 Tex. 170, 175, 264 S.W.2d 692, 695 (1954). 
 108. Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. 1964). 
 109. Id. 
 110. MCGOVERN, supra note 102, at 316. 
 111. RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, at § 8.1 cmt. s. 
 112. Id. 
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general speculation on your part that Dr. Jekyll was hampered by an insane delusion 
at the time he made his will would have been insufficient evidence on which to strike 
down the will. Certainly, you must concede this point.” 
“Reluctantly, I do sir,” rejoined the lawyer. 
I continued. “If, at that very time when Dr. Jekyll delivered his will to you, you 
had learned that he believed he could become Edward Hyde and therefore wanted 
to leave his entire estate to his alter ego, you might well have said that this was an 
insane delusion, for how could any rational person believe such a thing? That certainly 
would be specific evidence of an insane delusion on his part that produced his testa-
mentary disposition, even though, as I said before, the doctor most likely was not 
generally of unsound mind. However, as you later learned, Dr. Jekyll, on a regular 
basis, was becoming Mr. Hyde at this time. Thus, the will was not a product of sup-
posed facts that do not exist. Instead, as you subsequently learned, the will was a 
product of a fact (the Jekyll-to-Hyde transformation) which, as astounding as it 
seemed, was indeed occurring in the real world of your story. Q.E.D., there was no 
insane delusion. Again, I believe that you must concur in this ultimate conclusion.” 
The solicitor simply shrugged, and our dialogue moved on to the matters of 
undue influence and duress. 
A COLLOQUY ON UNDUE INFLUENCE AND DURESS 
“By any chance, sir, have you a bottle of port or brandy of which we might 
partake?” Utterson inquired. 
“Unfortunately, Mr. Utterson, I don’t keep such things in my office. However, 
I would be delighted to give you a bottle of water.” 
“I do not understand, Mr. Alton. Does your water come in bottles? I thought 
that in your country in your day and age you would have running water—running 
through pipes into your buildings.” 
“We do, sir, but I have no running water in my office. However, I always have 
on hand here a small supply of water, which is contained in plastic bottles.” 
“I do not understand, Mr. Alton. Plastic?  Is that some sort of glass product?” 
“No, sir, it is a substance that is often used as a substitute for glass; among other 
uses, it holds liquids,” I answered. “Let us, please, return to our discussion of Dr. 
Jekyll’s will and his mental state. Let us explore the matters of undue influence and 
duress, which you raised at several different times in the story. 
“First, we must define both undue influence and duress, which are closely re-
lated legal concepts. Our Restatement provides that a donative transfer such as a will 
‘is invalid to the extent that it was procured by undue influence, duress, or fraud.’113 
The Restatement goes on to define both undue influence and duress. ‘Undue influ-
ence’ occurs where ‘the wrongdoer exerted such influence over the donor that it 
overcame the donor’s free will and caused the donor to make a donative transfer that 
the donor would not otherwise have made.’114 ‘Duress’ occurs where ‘the wrongdoer 
                                                          
 113. RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, at § 8.3(a). 
 114. Id. at § 8.3(b). 
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threatened to perform or did perform a wrongful act that coerced the donor into 
making a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.’115 The 
Restatement states that an act ‘is wrongful if it is criminal or one that the wrongdoer 
had no right to do.’116 And, while ‘an act or threat to do an act that the wrongdoer 
had a right to do does not constitute duress, such a threat or act can constitute undue 
influence, for example, a threat to abandon an ill testator.’117 
“Now,” I continued, “let’s first examine undue influence. Our leading Texas 
case on this point is Long v. Long.118 In this case, our supreme court stated that 
[i]t is not possible to frame a definition of undue influence which embraces all forms 
and phases of the term. Every case is different from every other case, and must depend 
largely on its own facts and circumstances. Generally speaking, undue influence is such 
influence or dominion as exercised at the time, under the facts and circumstances of 
the case, which destroys the free agency of the testator, and substitutes in the place 
thereof the will of another . . . Also, undue influence has been defined as ‘that which 
compels the testator to do that which is against his will from fear, the desire of peace, 
or some feeling which he is unable to resist.119 
Undue influence is not the same thing as general mental incapacity or unsoundness 
of mind: 
Undue influence and mental incapacity are two distinct grounds for avoiding a will. 
Undue influence in its essential elements has no real relation to mental incapacity. 
Mental incapacity implies the lack of intelligent mental power, while undue influence 
implies within itself the existence of a mind of sufficient mental capacity to make a 
will, if not hindered by the dominant or overriding influence of another in such a way 
as to make the instrument speak the will of the person exercising undue influence, and 
not that of the testator.120 
I ask you, Mr. Utterson, what sort of undue influence did you believe Mr. Hyde ex-
erted to subvert the will of Dr. Jekyll, producing the doctor’s initial will—the one to 
which you so objected?” 
“I was not certain, Mr. Alton,” returned the solicitor. “The will set me upon my 
quest to ‘set eyes on’ this Mr. Hyde so that I might see my ‘friend’s strange preference 
or bondage (call it what you please) and even for the startling clause of the will.’121 
In fact, Dr. Jekyll admitted to me that it was Mr. Hyde ‘“who dictated the terms”’ of 
the doctor’s will,122 at least as to its acting as a deed of gift in the event of the doctor’s 
                                                          
 115. Id. at § 8.3(c).   
 116. Id. at § 8.3 cmt. i.  
 117. See id.  
 118. Long v. Long, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034 (1939). 
 119. Id. at 1035 (citation omitted). The court said that “the influence is not undue unless the free agency of the 
testator has been destroyed, and a will produced that such testator did not desire to make.” Id. at 1035-36. 
 120. Id. at 1036. 
 121. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 47. 
 122. Id. at 73. 
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unexplained absence for any period exceeding three calendar months.123 Thus, I sus-
pected undue influence but could not precisely state what the scope of that influence 
might have been.” 
“Well, counselor,” I replied, “as another court has stated: ‘It cannot be said that 
every influence exerted by one person on the will of another is undue, for the influ-
ence is not undue unless the free agency of the testator was destroyed and a testament 
produced that expresses the will of the one exerting the influence.’124 The burden of 
proving undue influence would be on the party contesting the will’s validity.125 What 
the contestant must prove, in order to establish undue influence, has been stated as 
follows: 
(1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) the effective operation of such in-
fluence so as to subvert or overpower the mind of the testator at the time of the exe-
cution of the testament [i.e., that the influence was undue]; and (3) the execution of a 
testament which the maker thereof would not have executed but for such influence 
[i.e., actual causation].126 
Thus, the burden of proving all three elements of undue influence would have lain 
with the contestant of Dr. Jekyll’s will, who would have had to establish all three 
elements. As you’ve said, Mr. Utterson, Dr. Jekyll admitted to you that Mr. Hyde 
dictated at least some of the terms of the will (the deed of gift in the event of the 
doctor’s prolonged absence).127 Likely, this would be enough to establish the exist-
ence and exertion of an influence. But, not ‘every influence exerted by one person 
over the mind of another is undue.’128 How would you be able to prove that Mr. 
Hyde’s influence over Dr. Jekyll was undue—that it subverted or overpowered Dr. 
Jekyll’s mind? That would be more difficult to show, as would the third element—
that Dr. Jekyll executed a will that he would not have executed but for the undue 
influence. Once again, Mr. Utterson, I fail to see that the influence apparently exerted 
by Hyde was in fact undue. And, of course, given what you later discovered about 
Dr. Jekyll’s and Mr. Hyde’s unitary identity, it seems extremely unlikely that undue 
influence could have been established, for how could one exercise undue influence 
over one’s own self? Surely, the wrongdoer must be some person other than the 
testator himself or herself.” 
“Well, Mr. Alton,” said Utterson, “let us now turn to the question of duress, 
for which, I believe, there is far more evidence than mere undue influence. Before I 
learned the shocking truth about Dr. Jekyll becoming Mr. Hyde, I believed that Mr. 
Hyde might have been blackmailing the doctor, lording some awful, dark secret over 
my friend. I thought that this secret provided the powerful hold that Mr. Hyde had 
over Dr. Jekyll and that this secret—or, rather, the threatened disclosure of this se-
cret—formed the basis for the duress that produced the will in favor of Mr. Hyde.” 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 44. 
 124. Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1963) at 922.   
 125. Id. (citation omitted); See also, RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, at § 8.3 cmt. b.  
 126. Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922. 
 127. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 73. 
 128. Long, 125 S.W.2d at 1035. (emphasis added). 
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“Mr. Utterson, might I please ask you to recount the times during the story at 
which you stated your belief in this power Mr. Hyde held over Dr. Jekyll?” I asked. 
“Gladly sir, for I remember each of them very well,” replied Utterson. “The 
first instance occurred at the story’s outset. I was discussing Dr. Jekyll’s new friend 
Mr. Hyde with my cousin, Mr. Enfield.129 In fact, it was my cousin Enfield who first 
broached the matter of blackmail, saying that the relationship was ‘“[b]lack mail, I 
suppose; an honest man paying through the nose for some of the capers of his 
youth.”’130 When I began my search for Mr. Hyde, I mentioned to Dr. Lanyon that 
what I thought ‘“was madness”’ I began to fear was, instead, ‘“disgrace.”’131 The 
more I considered the situation, the more concerned I was that Mr. Hyde was ‘a 
figure to whom power was given’ and that Jekyll ‘must rise and do its [i.e., Hyde’s] 
bidding.’132 
“A short while later, I met the terrible Mr. Hyde, and immediately after that 
meeting I remarked rhetorically, ‘“O my poor old Harry Jekyll, if ever I read Satan’s 
signature upon a face, it is on that of your new friend.”’133 After discussing Mr. Hyde 
with Dr. Jekyll’s servant, Poole, I thought, 
Poor Harry Jekyll . . . my mind misgives me he is in deep waters! He was wild when 
he was young; a long while ago to be sure; but in the law of God, there is no statute 
of limitations. Ay, it must be that; the ghost of some old sin, the cancer of some con-
cealed disgrace; punishment coming, pede clando.134 
“Later, still, after dining with poor Harry Jekyll, I tarried to speak with my friend 
after the other dinner guests had left his rooms, and our discussion turned to that 
holographic will he made in favor of Hyde.135 Dr. Jekyll remarked that I was ‘“so 
distressed”’ by his will, and I admitted that, as he knew, ‘“I never approved of it.”’136 
When I told my friend that I had been making inquiries about Mr. Hyde and did not 
like what I had heard, Dr. Jekyll said, 
I am painfully situated, Utterson; my position is a very strange—a very strange one. It 
is one of those affairs that cannot be mended by talking . . . [B]ut indeed it isn’t what 
you fancy; it is not as bad as that . . . [However,] this is a private matter, and I beg of 
you to let it sleep.137 
“I was now even more convinced,” continued Utterson, “that Mr. Hyde had 
learned one or more of Dr. Jekyll’s early secrets, that the reprobate was blackmailing 
my friend, and that the former had threatened to reveal the latter’s secrets unless the 
doctor made the holographic will leaving his entire estate to Mr. Hyde. Later, after I 
                                                          
 129. See generally, ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 31-41. 
 130. Id. at 39. 
 131. Id. at 44. 
 132. Id. at 46. 
 133. Id. at 51. 
 134. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 52-53. 
 135. See generally, id. at 55-58. 
 136. Id. at 56. 
 137. Id. at 57. 
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met my friend—and Dr. Jekyll’s erstwhile friend—Dr. Lanyon and heard his ‘remark-
able incident,’ Henry Jekyll wrote to me, saying ‘“[i]f I am the chief of sinners, I am 
the chief of sufferers also.”’138 I thought this ‘pointed to madness,’ but given Dr. 
Lanyon’s story, I thought there might also be ‘some deeper ground’ for poor Harry’s 
sad situation.139 That is, I still believed that blackmail was at the root of Mr. Hyde’s 
hold over Dr. Jekyll.140 Thus, there were at least five separate instances at which I 
thought Hyde’s blackmail lay behind his accursed hold on my friend and client.” 
When my visitor had finished his disquisition, I said, “Mr. Utterson, please al-
low me to apply the test for duress to the facts you have just now adduced. As you 
will recall, our Restatement provides that ‘[a] donative transfer is procured by duress 
if the wrongdoer threatened to perform or did perform a wrongful act that coerced 
the donor into making a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have 
made.’141 The Restatement goes on to say that an act ‘is wrongful if it is criminal or 
one that the wrongdoer had no right to do.’142 Based on what you knew at the time—
that is, before you learned the truth about Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde—let us assume, 
for the sake of argument, that your reasonable inference was correct. That is, let us 
assume that Mr. Hyde was blackmailing poor Henry Jekyll and that Dr. Jekyll’s will 
in favor of Mr. Hyde was the product of this blackmail, this threat to reveal secrets 
that Edward Hyde possessed. Certainly, this would be a ‘threat[] to perform . . . a 
wrongful act [i.e., blackmail] that coerced the donor [i.e., Dr. Jekyll] into making a 
donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made [i.e., the will in favor 
of Mr. Hyde].’143 Blackmail would meet the Restatement’s definition of a wrongful 
act because ‘it is criminal or one that the wrongdoer [i.e., Mr. Hyde] had no right to 
do.’144 Thus, I would likely conclude, as you did, sir, that the holographic will leaving 
Dr. Jekyll’s entire estate to Mr. Hyde was indeed a product of duress. Of course, as 
you later discovered to your utter astonishment (if you will pardon the unfortunate 
pun), Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde were one and the same person; therefore, no duress 
was present at all, despite the way the situation had earlier appeared to you.” 
THE SLAYER RULE CONSIDERED 
“It is getting rather late, Mr. Alton,” said Utterson. 
“Mr. Utterson, might I beg your kind indulgence to remain with me for a while 
longer so that we may continue our discussion?” I pleaded. “I very much appreciate 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 81. 
 139. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 81.  
 140. In the previous chapter (chapter five—“Incident of the Letter”), Utterson’s law clerk, Guest, noticed “a rather 
singular resemblance” between the handwriting of Jekyll and Hyde. Id. at 76. Utterson later remarked to himself, 
“‘What! . . . Henry Jekyll forge for a murderer!’” Id. This remark serves as additional evidence that Utterson believed 
Hyde had some strange hold on Jekyll—most likely, blackmail—which continued to cause Jekyll to do Hyde’s bid-
ding, including making the will in favor of Hyde. The reference to Hyde as a murderer follows Hyde’s murder of one 
of Utterson’s clients, Sir Danvers Carew, in chapter four (“The Carew Murder Case”). See generally id. at 61-68. 
 141. RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, at § 8.3(c).   
 142. Id. at § 8.3 cmt. i.  
 143. Id. at § 8.3(c).   
 144. Id. at § 8.3 cmt. i. 
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your patience and your kindness in examining these matters with me, and I am not 
certain when—if ever—such an opportunity may again arise.” 
“Very well, sir, I remain at your service,” Utterson replied. 
“Thank you, counselor. Might we next examine the issue of the so-called ‘slayer 
rule?’ That rule provides that a person who otherwise would inherit or take under a 
will is barred if that person intentionally brought about the death of the intestate 
decedent or the testator, as the case may be.145 Our Restatement puts the rule this 
way: ‘[a] slayer is denied any right to benefit from the wrong . . . . [A] slayer is a person 
who, without legal excuse or justification, is responsible for the felonious and inten-
tional killing of another.’146 According to the Restatement, 
[t]he rationale for the slayer rule is the prevention of unjust enrichment, in accord with 
the maxim that a wrongdoer cannot profit from his or her wrong. Any enrichment 
accruing to a slayer from the wrong is unjust and is not allowed. The slayer’s motive 
in committing the wrong is irrelevant. Application of the slayer rule does not depend 
on a showing that the motive for the slaying was to obtain a financial benefit.147 
“Now, Mr. Utterson, please permit me to review with you the times at which 
you—or others in your tale—expressed your concern that Mr. Hyde might murder, 
or indeed had murdered, Dr. Jekyll. As we know, Mr. Hyde did in fact commit murder 
(or, at least, manslaughter), for he killed your client, Sir Danvers Carew.148 When you 
first encountered Mr. Hyde, you wondered whether he might have been thinking of 
the will when he told you that he was glad you two had met.149 Shortly after this 
encounter, and after speaking with Poole, you thought to yourself that ‘“if this Hyde 
suspects the existence of the will, he may grow impatient to inherit.”’150 After the 
dinner party at Dr. Jekyll’s home, when you remained behind and discussed the will 
with him, as well as the fact that you had met Mr. Hyde, the doctor asked you to 
promise him that you would help Mr. Hyde to ‘“get his rights”’ in the event that Dr. 
Jekyll were ‘“taken away.”’151 As I read this exchange, you took this as an indication 
that your friend, at this time, might have feared for his life at the hands of Hyde, even 
though you did not express that feeling at this point. Am I correct in this regard?” 
Utterson nodded his head, and I continued. “Later, when you were about to 
search Mr. Hyde’s rooms in the immediate aftermath of the Carew murder, you 
thought to yourself that he was ‘a man who was heir to [a] quarter of a million ster-
ling.’152 Of course, as Dr. Jekyll had not yet died and his will, therefore, was not yet 
operative, Mr. Hyde was not yet his devisee—he simply was his presumptive devisee. 
And, in fact, you yourself ultimately proved to be your friend’s devisee.153 But, your 
                                                          
 145. MCGOVERN, supra note 102, at 80. See generally id. at 80-88. 
 146. RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, at § 8.4(a). 
 147. Id. at § 8.4 cmt. b.  
 148. See generally ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 61-68. 
 149. Id. at 50. 
 150. Id. at 53. 
 151. Id. at 57. 
 152. Id. at 66. 
 153. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 102. 
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reference on that occasion to Mr. Hyde’s status as the beneficiary of Dr. Jekyll’s will 
must have indicated, once again, your fear that Mr. Hyde might take matters into his 
own hands in order to hasten his succession. After the Carew murder, you went to 
see your friend and, among other matters, discussed the terms of the will; you got the 
doctor to admit that Mr. Hyde had ‘“dictated”’ at least some of its terms.154 You 
immediately said to your friend, ‘“I knew it . . . He meant to murder you. You have 
had a fine escape.”’155 After Dr. Lanyon’s funeral, you received an envelope from 
him, which you did not read at that time—per his handwritten instructions—and 
which specifically stated that the envelope was ‘“not to be opened until the death or 
disappearance of Dr. Henry Jekyll.”’156 You thought to yourself, ‘here again were the 
idea of a disappearance and the name of Henry Jekyll bracketed’ and you thought 
again of your friend’s holographic will, which you ‘had long ago restored to its au-
thor.’157 
“On the last night of your friend’s life,” I said, “before you discovered his hor-
rible secret, you and Poole stood outside the doctor’s cabinet door, trying to deter-
mine who might be inside, what had happened inside, and what to do about it.158 
Poole said to you that ‘“master’s made away with,”’159 and ‘“it is the belief of my 
heart that there was murder done.”’160 Just before you and Poole decided to break 
down Dr. Jekyll’s cabinet door, you told Poole that you now agreed with him: ‘“I 
believe poor Harry is killed; and I believe his murderer [by which you meant Mr. 
Hyde] (for what purpose, God alone can tell) is still lurking in his victim’s room.”’161 
Finally, after Dr. Jekyll’s door was forced open and you discovered Mr. Hyde, dead, 
in the room, you told Poole that ‘“Hyde is gone to his account; and it only remains 
for us to find the body of your master.”’162 You found no ‘trace of Henry Jekyll, dead 
or alive,’ and Poole thought he must be buried in the cellar, although you thought it 
possible that he might have ‘“fled”’ the house.163 
“Thus,” I summarized, “up to this point in the story, before you read Dr. Lan-
yon’s narrative and Dr. Jekyll’s own ‘full statement,’ you believed that Mr. Hyde had 
killed Dr. Jekyll—a belief or fear you had expressed at least six times. Assuming, as 
it certainly appeared to you and to Poole at your story’s climax, that this act was done 
feloniously and intentionally, and without legal excuse or justification, then Mr. Hyde 
most likely would have been denied the right to benefit from his wrongdoing—he 
would not take under the holographic will Dr. Jekyll had made in his favor.164 Mr. 
Hyde would not have been able to profit from his own wrongdoing.165 Does this not 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 73. 
 155. Id. at 74. 
 156. Id. at 82. 
 157. Id.  
 158. See generally ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 91-94. 
 159. Id. at 92. 
 160. Id. at 94. 
 161. Id. at 96-97. 
 162. Id. at 100. 
 163. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 100. 
 164. RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, at § 8.4(a). 
 165. Id. at § 8.4 cmt. b.   
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describe your assessment of the entire situation—both Dr. Jekyll’s fate and Mr. 
Hyde’s right to take under his will—in light of what you knew or believed at the time, 
Mr. Utterson?” 
“Yes, indeed, Mr. Alton,” rejoined the solicitor, “that is a fair statement of my 
assessment of the situation as it stood at that time. Of course, as I subsequently 
learned and as all those who have read my tale now know, Mr. Hyde did not kill Dr. 
Jekyll; the two men were one and the same, and Dr. Jekyll—or should I say, rather, 
Mr. Hyde—killed himself. As it turned out, there never was any question of Mr. 
Hyde’s taking under Dr. Jekyll’s will, for if the one were deceased, so would be the 
other.” 
OUR DIALOGUE CONCLUDES WITH SOME ADDITIONAL, MISCELLANEOUS 
OBSERVATIONS 
“Mr. Utterson,” I remarked, “I would like to make a couple of comments about 
what you refer to as the ‘deed of gift’ in Dr. Jekyll’s will to Mr. Hyde.166 We have 
already spoken about this provision of the will, which states if the doctor were to 
disappear or be absent without explanation for more three calendar months, Mr. 
Hyde would ‘step into . . . Henry Jekyll’s shoes without further delay.’167 Dr. Jekyll’s 
final will—the one that made you the beneficiary of his estate—contained the same 
‘deed of gift’ provision.168 Interestingly, an early reviewer of your story pointed out 
that this provision would become operative only when the will did, upon Dr. Jekyll’s 
death.169 Therefore, the reviewer stated, the doctor’s disappearance for a mere three 
months would neither make the will operative nor permit Dr. Jekyll’s executor to 
carry out the deed of gift.170 However, it is possible to read this provision as Dr. 
Jekyll’s intention to make Mr. Hyde his attorney-in-fact in the event of the former’s 
disappearance or extended absence. That is, Jekyll’s will might have been intended to 
serve an alternative, life-time purpose as a general power of attorney in favor of his 
agent, Mr. Hyde. If I am correct in my interpretation of this provision of the will, 
then that document would have been valid both as a will (operative at the doctor’s 
death) and as a life-time power of attorney.” 
“You may be correct in your analysis of the legal effect of the will and the power 
of attorney, Mr. Alton,” said Utterson, “but might I respectfully note, sir, that this 
makes no difference in that most negative light in which I viewed the document?” 
“This brings me to two other matters that I would like to discuss with you, Mr. 
Utterson. The first is your standing, or legal right, to challenge the validity of Dr. 
Jekyll’s will. Certainly, you objected to the will that made Mr. Hyde the beneficiary, 
but the situation never presented itself where that will would have to be admitted to 
probate because, as we have seen, Dr. Jekyll made a subsequent holographic will 
                                                          
 166. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 44. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 102. 
 169. See id. at 44 n.4. See also id. at 259-60 (Appendix E, quoting an unsigned review of the novella by E.T. COOK, 
dated January 16, 1886, appearing in Athenaeum). 
 170. Id. 
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naming you as the beneficiary.171 However, had Dr. Jekyll died with his first will still 
in force, I do not believe that you would have had standing to challenge the will’s 
validity. In order to have standing to contest a will’s admission to probate, a person 
must have a financial interest in the contest.172 While our Texas Estates Code permits 
an ‘interested person’ to contest a will,173 the code defines an ‘interested person’ as 
‘an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim 
against an estate being administered.’174 Might I tactfully suggest, Mr. Utterson, that 
you did not fit within any of these categories and, therefore, would not have been 
able to make a legal challenge to the will that you found so objectionable? Indeed, as 
there is no indication that Dr. Jekyll had any heirs or creditors, it is unclear who might 
have had standing to contest this will. Perhaps the Crown might have had standing, 
to the extent that the will’s invalidity would have resulted in the escheat of the doc-
tor’s estate.”175 
“I understand your point about standing, Mr. Alton, and I cannot say that I 
disagree with your conclusions, sir,” the solicitor replied. 
“Of course, Mr. Utterson, when you found Dr. Jekyll’s final will among his 
papers—the will that bore your name as the beneficiary of his estate, the Utterson 
will—all of what we have said about the validity of the earlier will in favor of Mr. 
Hyde became moot. The Utterson will was his final testament, although, in a way, his 
‘full statement of the case’ was his final testament to you, for it explained the myste-
rious relationship between the doctor and Mr. Hyde.176 Dr. Jekyll concluded his ‘full 
statement’ by saying that ‘this is the true hour of my death, and what is to follow 
concerns another than myself.’177 
“Interestingly, someone with standing—whoever that might be—might raise 
some of the very same legal challenges to the validity of the doctor’s final will (the 
Utterson will, the one in your favor) that we have discussed above. Although I have 
concluded that Dr. Jekyll was likely not of unsound mind or laboring under an insane 
delusion when he made his first will in favor of Mr. Hyde, if that will had indeed been 
invalid for either of those reasons, so might the Utterson will have been invalid for 
these very same reasons. Certainly, you were not intending to slay your good friend 
Henry Jekyll, nor were you attempting to blackmail him; thus, what we said above 
about the earlier Hyde will regarding Mr. Hyde’s possible murder or blackmail of Dr. 
Jekyll would be irrelevant in the matter of the validity of your will.”178 
“I should say so, sir!” exclaimed Utterson. 
                                                          
 171. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 102. 
 172. MCGOVERN, supra note 102, at 640. 
 173. ESTATE CODE, supra note 89, at § 55.001. 
 174. Id. at § 22.018(1). 
 175. See MCGOVERN, supra note 102, at 641. 
 176. See generally ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 115-36. Dr. Lanyon’s “narrative” in chapter nine solved the mystery. 
Id. at 105-12. 
 177. Id. at 136. Jekyll writes his final explanation of the matter “under the influence of the last of the old powders.” 
Id. He has run out of his supply of the transformative antidote, and he knows he will change into Hyde forever, 
which will mean his death one way or another. Id.  
 178. But see supra, text accompanying notes 34-36. 
23
Alton: The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll’s Will: A Tale of Testamentary Cap
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
 286 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:263 
“However, there is one more, quite delicate point that I would like to raise with 
you regarding the validity of Dr. Jekyll’s final will, the Utterson will that he made in 
your favor. You, the beneficiary, were both his friend and his attorney.” 
“But, Mr. Alton, I did not draft either of Dr. Jekyll’s holographic wills,” inter-
jected Utterson, who obviously anticipated my point. “I did not participate in the 
creation of either will. Henry Jekyll did not seek my advice as to either will. Indeed, 
the existence of his final will—the one substituting my name for that of Edward Hyde 
as the beneficiary—was entirely unknown to me and came as a complete surprise.”179 
“I am most aware of that, counselor,” I rejoined. “One authority has said that, 
in the context of undue influence, ‘[p]articularly troubling are wills that benefit the 
drafting lawyer.’180 Texas has a statue on point. Our Estates Code, at section 
254.003(a), invalidates a devise in a will if the devise is made to ‘an attorney who 
prepares or supervises the preparation of the will.’181 Had you drafted Dr. Jekyll’s 
final will, the devise of his entire estate to you would have been void, and thus he 
would have died intestate as to the bulk of his estate—the quarter-million pounds 
sterling to which you alluded to earlier in the story.182 But, as you say, you did not 
draft the Utterson will. Therefore, the strong presumption of invalidity (or even au-
tomatic invalidity) that would attach to the devise in your favor if you had in fact 
drafted the Utterson will is inapplicable here. However, in the unlikely event that 
there were a party with standing to challenge the Utterson will, it is at least conceiva-
ble that this party would attack the validity of the devise to you on the grounds of 
undue influence. That party’s argument would not be based on your having drafted 
the will; instead, it would be based on the confidential relationship that you had with 
Dr. Jekyll, your client in legal matters. He—or she—would claim that because you 
had such a long-standing, confidential relationship with Dr. Jekyll, a presumption 
might arise that this relationship unduly influenced the doctor to devise the bulk of 
his estate to you. I am sorry if I offend you; such is not my intention. But, I believe I 
owe you a duty of candor in our discussion.” 
“You do not offend me, sir,” replied Utterson. 
“Well, I suppose that I have come to the end of my thoughts about the legal 
issues surrounding Dr. Henry Jekyll’s two wills, Mr. Utterson. We have spoken of 
many things—not shoes or ships or sealing wax or cabbages or kings. Rather, we 
have treated the many testamentary capacity issues in your tale: soundness of mind, 
insane delusion, undue influence, and duress. We also dealt with the so-called Slayer 
Rule, the standing to contest the probate of a will, and—just now—attorneys as will 
beneficiaries. 
“We now know that Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde were one and the same person,” 
I continued. “We also know that the doctor’s final will—the Utterson will—disposed 
                                                          
 179. See ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 102, where it is said that Utterson read his name in the final will “with inde-
scribable amazement,” and he exclaims to Poole, “[m]y head goes round.” Id. 
 180. MCGOVERN, supra note 102, at 334. 
 181. ESTATE CODE, supra note 89, at § 254.003(a)(1). There are certain exceptions to this rule (id. at § 254.003(b)), 
including a blood or marital relationship between the attorney and the testator, but none of these exceptions would 
have applied in the story, as Utterson was not related to Jekyll. 
 182. ESSENTIAL, supra note 5, at 66. 
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of almost his entire estate to you, sir. Therefore, virtually every testamentary capacity 
issue that we discussed tonight—although unbeknownst to you at the time your in-
quiries began—proved to be moot. Nevertheless, our analysis has been a valuable 
exercise because the legal issues raised in your experiences are ones with which law-
yers and law students have struggled for centuries and with which they continue to 
struggle to the present day. In my view, Jekyll likely was not of unsound mind or 
under an insane delusion when he made his initial will in favor of Hyde. Nor did 
Hyde hold your late friend under duress or undue influence. The slayer rule would 
not have applied here because the testator and his would-be slayer were the very same 
person. The only legal rules we spoke of tonight that might may not be moot involve 
the matters of standing to contest probate of a will and bequests to attorneys, the 
latter of which the Utterson will raises and which I humbly apologize for mentioning 
again. I must say, Mr. Utterson, you have been most generous with your time tonight, 
sir.” 
“And you with yours, Mr. Alton,” my visitor replied. “It has been my pleasure 
to meet you, sir, even though our conversation has occasionally been uncomfortable 
to me. And, now, please permit me to bid you a good night—or, perhaps, a good 
morning, for I see that your candle has burned very low indeed.” 
One glance at the candle on my desk demonstrated the accuracy of Utterson’s 
statement. More surprisingly, I didn’t remember ever having a candle on my desk! 
The learned counselor rose to depart, but lingered long enough to say, “If you 
ever find yourself in Victorian England, Mr. Alton, please do call upon me. I should 
very much like to raise a glass of port with you while discussing that centuries-old 
bane of our profession, the Rule Against Perpetuities.” 
With that, my nocturnal visitor from a distant century simply disappeared. Had 
it all been a dream? 
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